Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is created by asymmetric infromation before a transaction occurs. Adverse selection is usually found in insurance and credit markets, but can be found in other markets as well. Adverse selection is a part of agency theory.
For instance in the credit market those who have bad credit and are therefore bigger risks are more likely to seek out a loan. They are bigger risks because they are more likely to take chances with the money and use it poorly, this is why they have bad credit to begin with, and this is why they are in need of money. Creditors will thus be less likely to lend anyone because they can assume that if someone wants a loan from that they most likely have bad credit, even though they may not.
Adverse selection is also obersvable in the used car market and is referred to as the “lemon problem.” When you look to buy a used car from the newspaper you may not be able to tell right away that the transmission is on its last leg, even though the person who is selling the car, trying to dump it before it becomes cheaper to just buy a new one, knows that the transmission is on its last leg you do not, and there is an asymmetry of information. Because everyone knows that there is this asymmetry of information a car automatically uses a large portion of its value as soon as it drives off the new car lot, as now the market can not be sure on whether or not it is a lemon. Due to this lemon problem caused by adverse selection owners of non-lemons, referred to as peaches, may be unwilling to sell their car because they would receive less than its value in the market as its price would be lowered to compensate for the risk that it could be a lemon.
The market has found ways to combat adverse selection. In the credit markets creditors are able to assign people credit scores that show their history of paying back loans and are an indictation of their likelihood to pay back future loans. For people who do not yet have a credit score there usually need to be another signer with a favorable credit score on the loan, or the interest rate on the loan will be very high to compensate for the possibility of not being paid back. In markets like the used car markets dealers have stepped up to combat the lemon problem. They have expertise and methods to evaluate whether or not a car is a lemon before they buy it, eliminating the asymmetry of information, and then when they sell they can sell the car with their reputation and a warranty. Because of the dealer the used car buyer should not have to worry on whether or not the used car they bought is a lemon because they are aware of the dealer’s reputation or they have a warranty on the car.
